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Abstract
Being increasingly complex devices, smart TVs are becoming more capable and have the potential to receive,
store, process and transmit considerable amounts of personal data. These capabilities also represent several
diverse attack surfaces potentially rendering these devices highly vulnerable. The emergence and high adoption
rate of smart TVs have been drawing notable interest from security researchers and industry. We utilise an attack
surface area-based approach to assess the security of two modern smart TVs from different vendors and describe
some of the possible multi-surface attacks that can be carried out against these devices.
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INTRODUCTION
Integration of modern technologies and Internet connectivity has been driving the evolution of once isolated
traditional television (TV) sets into connected and feature rich living room hubs. The so-called “smart” TVs
incorporate various elements to offer an interactive, more engaging and personalised experience. In addition to
standard viewing features, these devices generally support local media playback, web browsing, streaming of
external media, support for voice commands as well as consumption of third party applications and content
services. Gartner (2012) state that there will be around 200 million smart TVs sold in 2016 and at least 1 in 8
Australians now have a smart TV in their home (Roy Morgan Research, 2015). The rich feature set provided by
these devices represents a diverse range of potential attack surfaces. Given two smart TVs by different
manufacturers, we examine some of these surfaces and discuss potential attack scenarios.

RELATED WORK
A smart TV is a device that integrates traditional television technology with a computing platform (Sutherland,
Read, & Xynos, 2014). Arguably, smart TVs can be classified as Internet of Things (IoT) devices. In our study,
we employ the definition by Whitehouse (2014) who describes IoT as “a global network infrastructure, linking
physical and virtual objects through the exploitation of data capture and communication capabilities…”
assuming data capture, event transfer, network connectivity and interoperability as its key characteristics. As
discussed later, devices examined by us were found to exhibit all of these traits.
IoT Security
The business-oriented IoT application space often dictates the need for cost-effective business models that can
result in overlooking security to reduce time to market and lower the production expenditure. IoT security is an
active research area with a number of unaddressed challenges. According to Suo, Wan, Zou, and Liu (2012),
these challenges emerge because:
1.
2.
3.

IoT extends the traditional internet using a variety of established and emerging protocols;
Nodes in IoT deployments have internet connectivity; and
Nodes are also potentially interconnected.

Being possibly inter-linked extensions of the Internet, IoT deployments present an expanded attack surface. This
notion is made worse by the fact that large-scale deployments consist of an array of diverse nodes, which are
often characterised by limited computational resources and lack of convenient physical access (Gang, Zeyong, &
Jun, 2011). From the data handling perspective, privacy issues represent a significant concern, with the European
Commission stating that, in the first instance, IoT deployments are unlikely to be designed to meet the relevant
requirements, such as the right of deletion and the right to be forgotten (Whitehouse, 2014). Finally, from the
legislation perspective, there is a need for new and improved regulation reflecting the unique challenges of IoT
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through a “heterogeneous and differentiated legal framework” that is able to handle the global and ubiquitous
nature of IoT (Weber, 2010).

Figure 1. Layered IoT Security Architecture. Based on Suo et al. (2012, pp. 648-649).
To systemise the diversity of inherent security challenges, a number of researchers described similar IoT security
architectures with one example presented in Figure 1 (Heer et al., 2011; Jing, Vasilakos, Wan, Lu, & Qiu, 2014;
Suo et al., 2012). However, it may not be practical to structure applied security assessments based on a highlevel architecture alone.

Figure 2. IoT Attack Surface Areas. Based on Miessler (2015).
To support and inform practical assessments, the community behind the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) introduced the “IoT Top 10” list of common security issues (OWASP, 2015). The listing has been
subsequently complemented by an array of fifteen IoT attack surface areas to facilitate a universal approach, as
shown in Figure 2 (Miessler, 2015). Thus, we structure our study based on a subset of these areas. We also
propose an additional item called “Development Tools” to reflect the fact that examination of developer
resources can provide its own benefits, as discussed later in this paper.
Smart TV Security
Grattafiori and Yavor (2013) provide a comprehensive analysis of Samsung smart TV security and demonstrate
how specific components such as firmware, applications and web browser can be easily attacked in a targeted
fashion due to a “systemic problem within the platform”. Lee and Kim (2013) provide a vendor-agnostic
overview, labelling smart TVs an ideal target for surveillance activities. However, the TV does not need
necessarily to be compromised to enable surveillance, as the feature may already be present by design. For
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instance, certain smart TVs have been found to be sending voice data to a third party service over an
unencrypted channel for the stated purpose of voice recognition (Munro, 2015).
Oren and Keromytis (2014) describe a method of abusing the Hybrid Broadcast-Broadband Television (HbbTV)
standard to inject malicious payloads into the TV content stream, which is rendered by a web browser engine.
The discussed method could be used to mount a large-scale attack targeting in excess of 20,000 devices from a
single location for under US$450. Unfortunately, this research was dismissed as being potentially insignificant
due to stated reasons of difficulty of wide scale deployment and monetization of such an attack.
Smart TV Forensics
The feature set provided by smart TVs has the potential to facilitate misuse, making the device a possible yet
neglected source of digital evidence. Guidance on forensic examination of smart TVs at the time of writing
appears to be scarce and the process generally requires access to specialised expertise and hardware (Sutherland
et al., 2014). Possibly the most comprehensive guide at the time of writing is provided by Boztas, Riethoven, and
Roeloffs (2015). The guide suggests that smart TVs should be treated like any other embedded system and
describes a number of acquisition methods. However, as the study is limited to the specific make and model, and
as such additional research in this area is still needed.
Problem Statement and Significance
Smart TVs can act as intermediaries between the Internet and the local home or corporate network. A
compromised device could be used to mount additional attacks against other smart appliances and traditional
devices. In a surveillance context, the camera and microphone of a compromised smart TV could be used to
observe residents or workers – an activity that was found to be the biggest fear of a smart TV owner (Lee &
Kim, 2013).
At the time of writing, most of the research into smart TV forensics and security is based on Samsung devices,
possibly due to their popularity and rootkit availability (SamyGo Forum, 2013). Yet, other vendors use different
technology components meaning that specific findings may not be universally applicable. For example, modern
LG devices are based on a derivative of the open source webOS operating system (LG Electronics, 2015c).
Panasonic smart TVs manufactured between 2010 and 2014 are based on the proprietary Viera Connect
platform, which utilises cloud-based application delivery model and requires an active Internet connection to
provide most of its features (Lane, 2013). Our hypothesis is that we can use open-source security assessment
tools and commodity hardware components to identify potential attack scenarios for smart TVs other than
Samsung.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
The following materials were used to complete the assessment:






Panasonic Viera THL50ET60A smart TV
LG 55UF770T smart TV
Apple Macbook Pro running Kali 2.0 penetration testing distribution
Asus Nexus 7 running Android 4.4.4 with Kali NetHunter 1.2 mobile penetration testing distribution
TP-LINK TL-WN722N USB wireless network interface card (NIC)

In order to achieve the required depth of assessment for the research at hand we focussed scope to that with the
greatest potential impact. Additionally, some areas of scope were eliminated due to the non-availability of
agreements required to access certain vendor and third party APIs. Subsequently, we concentrated our efforts on
the following areas:







Device physical interfaces
Device network services
Ecosystem communication
Mobile application
Network traffic
Development tools
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Figure 3. Assessment test bed based on the described materials.
We utilised a mix of open-source tools and commodity hardware to create the assessment test bed presented in
Figure 3. We provide an outline of the examination approach for every area in Table 1. The undertaken research
was conducted using a quasi-experimental methodology with empirical components. This methodology was
selected, as the nature of IoT devices is that they require data from external sources that are out of the author’s
control. While steps were taken to mitigate the impact of these variables it is not possible to control all of them
due to the connected nature of such devices.
Table 1. Assessment approach details for every examined surface area.
Surface Area

Method

Tools

Notes

Device physical
interfaces

Deliver a Human Interface Device
(HID) payload in an attempt to
initiate a background terminal
session with a reverse TCP shell.

HID Ducky Script Attack
using Kali NetHunter 1.2 and
wired USB connection to
smart TV.

The examination was limited
to external USB storage ports.

Device network
services

Enumerate and fingerprint
available network services using
common network reconnaissance
techniques.

Nmap (6.49BETA4) and
OpenVAS (8.0).

Ecosystem
communication /
Network traffic

Intercept and inspect network
payloads and metadata exchanged
between devices and their cloud
ecosystems and other endpoints.

Mitmproxy (0.13), tcpdump
(4.6.2), Wireshark (1.12.6)
and Mana toolkit (20150707).

Encrypted payloads were not
examined due to inability to
install custom trusted
certificates.

Mobile application

Intercept and inspect network
payloads and metadata exchanged
between the device and remote
control mobile app.

tcpdump (4.6.2), Wireshark
(1.12.6) and Mana toolkit
(20150707).

Traffic was captured en
masse for subsequent
analysis.

Development tools

Examine the provided device
emulator and software
development kit (SDK).

LG webOS TV Emulator
(2.0.0), LG webOS TV CLI

Due to lack of equivalent
tools for Panasonic devices,
only the LG emulator was
examined.

Network Capture Collection and Analysis
Where network traffic interception and inspection are involved, the analysis was performed on the basis of
captured packet files for each of the following scenarios:




Ecosystem communication / Network traffic – sequential action execution (refer to the relevant Results
section for action description) resulting in lg-network.pcap and pana-network.pcap.
Mobile application – interaction with two remote control mobile apps for each TV (refer to the relevant
Results section for app description) resulting in respective lg-remote-*.pcap and pana-remote-*.pcap
files.
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The overview of the captured packet traces is provided in Table 2. Subsequent analysis was performed with the
aid of both graphical and command-line packet inspection tools available as part of the Wireshark suite of
utilities. For the remainder of the areas, exploratory analysis was performed to determine feasible attack
scenarios that could drive future investigations.
Table 2. Overview of captured pcap files used in assessing ecosystem communication / network traffic and
mobile application surface areas.
File name

File size (bytes)

lg-network.pcap

Number of
packets
92222

89269227

Data size
(bytes)
87793651

Capture duration
(seconds)
992.667771

Average packet
size (bytes)
951.98

lg-remote-1.pcap
lg-remote-2.pcap

9691

4357427

4202347

151.865922

433.63

6196

2394510

2295350

206.704788

370.46

pana-network.pcap

10100

7261925

7100301

634.134583

703

pana-remote-1.pcap

5522

2762434

2674058

391.037781

484.26

pana-remote-2.pcap

6597

3192444

3086868

365.395744

467.92

RESULTS
We discuss our findings in the subsequent sections dedicated to each analysed surface area.
Device Physical Interfaces
Both devices undergoing evaluation had multiple USB ports capable of interfacing with external media storage
devices and input peripherals such as keyboards. Therefore, we assumed potential susceptibility of these
interfaces to Human Interface Device (HID) attacks such as those described by Crenshaw (2011). Kali
NetHunter 1.2 supports Rubber Ducky syntax-based payloads that encapsulate series of keystrokes interpreted
by the target system as keyboard input. While there are various ready-to-use payloads available, most of them
are tailored to Windows or OS X-based systems. Knowing that our smart TVs are Linux-based, we attempted a
number of payloads aimed at initiating a background terminal session with reverse TCP shell without success.
We observed that both TVs reacted to these payloads in similar fashion by demonstrating rapid channel or
application screen switches. A sample payload is presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Kali NetHunter 1.2 HID Ducky Script Editor screen showing one of the delivered payloads.
Device Network Services
Smart TVs are discoverable on the network to enable media streaming and remote control by mobile
applications. This functionality is achieved by exposing network services that could be enumerated using
standard reconnaissance tools. In addition to network service discovery, we performed vulnerability scans based
on identified ports, but the resulting findings were deemed insignificant. We categorised the discovered services
into:
1.
2.

Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) endpoints, and
Ancillary services

The former enables standard services such as media rendering and remote control, whereas the latter is
responsible for provisioning of specialised services, such as web page debugging. UPnP is a well-established
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standard that is prone to known security issues, such as common misconfiguration or the ability to exploit
specific implementations of the underlying libraries (Hemel, 2006; Moore, 2013). An example of an observed
UPnP profile description is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Subset of information available via UPnP service profile description at
http://<device_ip>:55000/nrc/ddd.xml for Panasonic smart TV.
Given that UPnP should not be configured to be accessible externally, discovery and exploitation of these
services requires presence on the internal network. While such actions may result in being able to send arbitrary
control commands to the device, we anticipate that targets of higher significance would be pursued in that
scenario. Nevertheless, information that can be obtained from UPnP endpoints can be used for device
fingerprinting as various unique identifiers and device capabilities including the list of installed applications can
be enumerated via endpoint interaction.
Ecosystem Communication and Network Traffic
Given that smart TVs rely on Internet access to enable most of the online features, we expected to encounter a
diverse set of packet traces of potential significance during the capture experiments. To facilitate the collection,
we executed a standardised set of sequential actions on each device:





Switch through 10 channels sequentially
Access the app store, install, use and remove an app (a weather app)
Insert a USB storage device and play a media file
Use voice control commands (LG smart TV only)

The high-level view of the resulting traffic flows is presented in Figure 6.

Figure 6. SSL and HTTP-based (plaintext) traffic flow statistics based on a pre-defined set of device interactions
for Panasonic (left) and LG (right) smart TV. The Y scale shows the number of packets using a 𝑙𝑜𝑔 scale. SSLbased interactions are shown in red.
Both devices rely on encrypted communications for the majority of interactions with their ecosystems. We
observed exceptions in these cases - Internet connectivity check, latest firmware version check and licence server
communication (LG only). However, respective payloads were represented by binary data decoded from base64
and would require prior knowledge about their structures for interpretation. Other plain-text traffic was observed
during:



Fetching of user interface elements (assets) and HTML-based application resources and data
Fetching of HbbTV content for Australian digital TV channels

In the latter case, we spotted HbbTV content being served in plain text from a centralised Freeview Plus service
that was launched in Australia in late 2014 (Healey, 2014). Both cases are equally significant, because they can
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be exploited to perform JavaScript injection attacks into a browser-like execution environment. We describe a
possible practical scenario later in this section.
Mobile Application
To diversify device control options, a user can choose to install a mobile app on their iOS or Android device.
The summary of our examination of these apps for each TV is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Findings associated with remote control mobile apps.
Description

LG

Panasonic

Mobile apps

LG TV Plus, webOS Magic Remote.

Panasonic TV Remote, Panasonic TV
Remote 2.

Device discovery and
communication method

UDP multicast discovery followed by HTTPbased UPnP endpoint communication using
XML payloads. WebSockets-based
communication for screen pointer controls.

UDP multicast discovery followed by
HTTP-based UPnP endpoint communication
using XML payloads.

Pairing requirement

Initial pairing triggers a 3-digit PIN displayed
on the smart TV screen. The correct PIN
needs to be supplied by the client to complete
the pairing while the message is being
displayed.

Not required.

TV remote equivalent with keyboard input.

TV remote equivalent with keyboard input.

Browser screen sharing, media sharing,
application enumeration and launch, TV
software version check and update
deployment (LG TV Plus only).

Browser screen sharing, media sharing,
application enumeration and launch (TV
Remote 2 only).

TV control capabilities
Ancillary capabilities

Thus, clients can use XML payload replay attacks to execute control commands on the TV. Fortunately, the
pairing process employed by the LG TV addresses this issue for untrusted clients.
Development Tools
Both devices allow installation of third party apps to personalise the TV and each vendor provides an app store
for developers to distribute their apps. To aid the development process, various tools are offered to the
community, including development guides, Application Programming Interface (API) references, sample code
and, in the case of LG webOS, device emulators (LG Electronics, 2015d; Panasonic, 2015). We examined the
available developer resources and focussed on the LG webOS 2.0.0 TV emulator as we expected it to be a
reasonable representation of emulated physical devices.

Figure 7. Modified sample JavaScript service containing the reverse shell payload (top) and output of simple
commands executed in the resulting shell (bottom).
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While the emulator is limited in its capabilities, it allows testing of all application types, including packaged
applications, hosted applications and JavaScript services. We successfully tested the ability to initiate a reverse
TCP shell to an arbitrary host and port by leveraging standard libraries available for the implementation of
JavaScript services, as shown in Figure 7. While it may not be feasible to embed this functionality in a real
application due to the possibility of being detected during the submission process, a malicious party could
attempt to employ various evasion techniques to bypass the quality assurance controls, especially if mostly static
analysis is used.
Furthermore, emulator app deployment is achieved over SSH. We were able to gain emulator shell access
directly for an unprivileged account. We were also able to read the emulator root password hash, meaning that in
theory one could obtain full access to the emulator given sufficient time and computational resources. We also
suspect that it may be possible to achieve successful privilege escalation by tailoring, cross compiling and
executing a targeted payload for the identified kernel version as an alternative to root password cracking. Even
with unprivileged access, an interested party is able to analyse the local file system and service configuration
files. Nevertheless, the LG device emulator could be used to gain additional insights into the possible inner
workings of emulated smart TVs.
Targeting Multiple Areas Via Inter-protocol Communication
Smart TVs come with a fully-fledged web browser, however the exposure of this to the user is dependent on the
device in question. Web browsers available on desktop and mobile platforms represent an attractive attack
surface (Alcorn, Frichot, & Orru, 2014). Packages installed on smart TVs are not necessarily any different,
because they are based on commonly available open source web rendering engines such as WebKit (Mautilus,
n.d.). In the case of smart TVs, web browsers are also used to render apps, which are built using standard
HTML5 technologies (LG Electronics, 2015b). An attacker could leverage existing browser exploitation tools
such as the Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) by Alcorn (2014) and gain TV browser control in the
following scenarios:




Compromise of a centralised content delivery service (e.g. Freeview Plus) to deliver JavaScript
payloads encapsulated inside HbbTV content
JavaScript payload injection into a TV-based app that fetches external resources
JavaScript payload injection into a hosted app

The last scenario is the least complex and can be easily demonstrated. A hosted app is an external HTML page
that is launched inside a browser-equivalent application execution environment. While destination pages of
hosted apps may be inspected during the store submission process, the provider can easily modify them after
they have been accepted. An example of a scenario where an attacker has modified the hosted app source to
inject the BeEF hook is shown in Figure 8. We were able to verify this scenario for both devices using the
provided application development tools.

Figure 8. A possible attack scenario against an LG webOS smart TV using a hosted application injected with
BeEF.
In the case of LG, we found that the execution environment for hosted apps appears identical to that used for
TV-based apps, providing access to certain system services that can be used to access potentially sensitive
information (LG Electronics, 2015a). Specifically, we were able to obtain the TV model name and firmware
version details, the internal IP address of the device, Service Set Identifier (SSID) of the associated wireless
access point and the IP address of the utilised Domain Name Server (DNS). In combination, this information
could be used to mount other attacks with the potential to provide access to network on which the TV is located.
Such access could be leveraged through interception of wireless traffic, firewall bypass technique’s (via UPNP
or NAT busting). Considering the unencrypted information leaks previously discussed this could lead to an
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attacker listening in on conversations that occur within range of the device as well as discovering the viewing
habits of the users. These scenarios are limited examples relating only to data that can be gathered from the
Smart TV itself, access to the local network has significant further potential for breaches of privacy.
For example, based on advertised retail prices, the model number could be used to infer the socioeconomic status
of the residents of the associated dwelling. Network SSID could be used to geolocate the access point using a
public access point location database such as WiGLE.net (Wigle.net, 2015). Such information has the potential
to facilitate the targeting of other crimes such as burglary or financial offenses. In the second case the Smart TV
potentially provides both identification of high value targets and means to access the network in order to
intercept banking and other financial transactions. A carefully crafted in-app popup mimicking native TV user
interface could be presented to the user asking them to re-enter their wireless credentials for the discovered SSID
due to a problem with network connectivity.

CONCLUSION
We followed a surface-area based approach to IoT device security assessment to examine the potential security
issues of two smart TVs from different vendors and proposed the inclusion of an additional element in the
framework. We inspected device physical interfaces, device network services, ecosystem communication,
network traffic, mobile applications and development tools using a test bed facilitated by open-source tools and
commodity hardware and identified a number of possible attack vectors. We conclude that inter-protocol
communication and script injection into a browser-based execution environment powering the smart TV user
experience provides an easy target that can be attacked to access device information not generally available in a
standard browser environment. In the future, we plan to conduct a more thorough examination of the app
execution environment and related attack scenarios.
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